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0.33 %Syria’s fate could have been different if Assad had agreed to enter talks with opposition parties before the war flared up in late November.
By Karya Naz Balkiz
Months before the regime of Bashar al Assad collapsed in Syria following a lightning attack by opposition forces, Türkiye had approached Assad to come to the negotiating table. But he refused.
Buoyed by his newfound closeness with the leaders of neighbouring Arab countries and hope that the Russia-Iranian nexus was ready to help, Assad made a disastrous calculation.
As Syria’s northern neighbour, Türkiye has high stakes in the civil war that has lasted for more than a decade. Millions of Syrian refugees live in Türkiye, and the Turkish leadership had its thumb on the pulse of shifting realities on the ground.
In the final months of Assad’s faltering rule, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan made repeated attempts to engage Assad in political dialogue, urging his regime to normalise ties with the opposition.
“What was new here, beyond the endorsement of a political solution, was the direct inclusion of the Assad regime in calls for political dialogue,” says Ahmet Arda Sensoy of the Türkiye Research Foundation (TAV).
Erdogan pointed out how Assad rebuffed his offer for talks.
“The value of the helping hand extended by our country was not recognised,” he said on Monday.
The situation would have been drastically different in Damascus if Assad agreed to a political solution.
Türkiye’s overture could have led to a transformation in which the opposition became part of the political process, and free and fair elections decided the country's fate, says Sensoy.
“Perhaps the Assad regime would have ended, but there could have been conditions under which the Baath regime persisted,” he tells TRT World.
A diplomatic decay
While the “rational” response was accepting Ankara’s helping hand, Assad’s inaction underscored his regime's political fragility, Sensoy explains.
Just as the opposition forces demonstrated Assad’s military weakness by reaching Damascus in under two weeks, his failure to respond to Türkiye’s proposals revealed a profound failure of Assad’s diplomatic outreach.
The Assad regime had been losing agency since 2013, becoming militarily reliant on Russia and Iran while grappling with severe economic and demographic crises. “It had lost the flexibility and diplomatic capacity to make such a political move,” says the TAV researcher.
Chronic issues ran deep, from a devastated economy to the inability to provide basic resources like electricity and oil – especially with critical oil fields falling under the control of the PKK/YPG terrorist organisation.
This convergence of military, economic, and diplomatic failures has left Syria vulnerable to further instability. Among the most pressing challenges is the PKK’s growing threat against the territorial integrity of Syria.
Preserving Syria’s territorial integrity
A key pillar of Türkiye's Syria policy, particularly since 2016, has been combating the PKK/YPG terrorist organisation entrenched east of the Euphrates. The YPG terrorists receive military and material funding from Washington.
Ankara has repeatedly warned that the group, beyond threatening Türkiye’s national security, holds separatist motives that endanger Syria’s territorial integrity.
In response to TRT World’s questions, the media office of the Syrian National Coalition, which represents the opposition forces, said PKK and its Syrian offshoot, YPG, continue to jeopardise Syria’s stability and security.
“To achieve lasting peace, it is essential to eradicate the sources of all terrorist organisations, especially those with separatist designs such as the PKK,” the Syrian National Coalition said, stressing the ongoing need for Türkiye's support.
Sensoy notes that in the short term, Ankara's primary focus in Syria will remain on its fight against terrorism, particularly the PKK/YPG.
“Perhaps with the new Damascus administration, a joint counterterrorism objective to root out the PKK/YPG presence in Syria may emerge,” he adds.
New Libya or New Syria?
Beyond the immediate threat of the PKK/YPG, Syria faces broader challenges in defining its post-war identity. Could the conflict-torn landscape resemble Libya's fractured aftermath, or could a new, unified Syria emerge?
Following Muammar Gaddafi’s ousting, Libya devolved into chaos as rival factions fought for control of Tripoli and access to the nation’s resources.
Sensoy warns that Syria’s fragmented opposition and tribal structures pose a similar risk.
Türkiye’s guiding role and close ties with opposition groups since 2016 could prove pivotal in averting such a scenario.
“Ankara's guidance could be Syria’s best chance to prevent the country from descending into Libya-like chaos,” says Sensoy.
A way back home
The future of Ankara-Damascus relations further hinges on the dignified and voluntary return of millions of refugees — a cornerstone of Türkiye’s Syria policy.
With opposition forces gaining control of Damascus, Türkiye anticipates a wave of refugees who will want to move back to Syria. Some have already begun returning.
Many of these refugees, some of whom were born and raised in Türkiye, share cultural and linguistic ties to the host country.
Sensoy anticipates that under the new administration, this could facilitate fresh integration efforts between Türkiye and Syria and closer relations “where economic and social life are intertwined.”
The Syrian National Coalition echoes this sentiment of renewed cooperation, stating: “Türkiye is a true ally of the Syrian people and will remain so as we build New Syria.”
“We look forward to new steps from Türkiye to ensure stability and peace in Syria in the coming period, and thank Türkiye for its longstanding support for the Syrian people.”
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